Posted May 16, 2018
Margaret Kosal, associate professor in the Nunn School, has an article titled “The Counter-WMD Strategy Gap” published in PRISM (Volume 7, no.3).
In 1994, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Gordon Sullivan, recognized the increasing threat of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the capability gaps exposed by the challenges of operating in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-contaminated environment. Although threats from WMD are neither new nor unrecognized at the highest levels of the U.S. Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DOD), remarkable gaps and inconsistencies between strategic level policy and operational capabilities persist. During the past 15 years, countering–WMD (CWMD) has been a top priority as expressed throughout multiple national and department-level strategy and policy documents, to include the National Security Strategy (NSS); the National Military Strategy (NMS); the National Defense Strategy (NDS); the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG); and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While a prevention strategy is laudable and important, the disparity between strategy and the required operational capabilities and capacities needed for securing, interdicting, and eliminating WMD reveals potential gaps that must be recognized and accounted for to ensure a credible deterrent posture. Future threats, especially biological, are likely to be more complicated than current or past conceptions.
Read the full article here
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